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1 Introduction 
Regulation of workers' dismissal is one of the labor market institutions most commonly 
invoked to explain the large and persistent differences between European and North Amer-
ican llllemployment rates. From a theoretical point of view, the effect of firing costs on 
employment is ambiguous. Firing costs reduce hiring during expansions, but these costs 
also reduce dismissals during downturns. The sign and the importance of the net effect 
depend on, among other factors, the persistence of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, 
the size of hiring and firing costs, and the rate of workers' voluntary quits. Therefore, it 
is an empirical question to evaluate how a reduction in firing costs affects employment in 
a particular economy. 
The empirical evidence in the literature is mixed. Using panel data of countries, 
Lazear (1990) obtains that regulation of workers' dismissal explain an important part 
of the variability of unemployment rates over time and over countries. Bentolila and 
Bertola (1990) calibrate a labor demand model using data of several European countries, 
and obtain negligible effects of firing costs on employment .. Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
(1993) extend this model to a general equilibrium framework with entry and exit of firms. 
They calibrate this model using US data and obtain that an introduction of firing cost 
would reduce employment importantly. In this context, the labor market reforms that 
several European COlllltries have implemented during the last fifteen years provide unique 
information to identify the effect of firing costs on firms' labor demand decisions. 
Labor Market Reforms in Europe 
Although the regulation of work contracts differs widely among European countries 
(see European Commission, 1996, 1997), most lab or market reforms carried out in these 
cOlllltries during the eighties and nineties were aimed to reduce costs associated with the 
dismissal of workers. l However, most of these reforms did not reduced firing costs for 
1During this period, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain passed new 
laws on temporary employment and dismissal costs. 
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all type of workers or labor contracts. A common feature was the elimination of many 
previous restrictions to hire and fire workers with fixed-term contracts, i.e., the so-called 
temporary contracts. Before the reforms, temporary contracts were mostly ruled by the 
principle of causality (Le., jobs that are occasional or seasonal, or to cover absent posts). 
Under the new legislation temporary contracts can be used for non temporary activi-
ties. The main differences between temporary or fixed-:term contracts and permanent or 
indefinite-duration contracts are the amount of severance payments, and the degree of 
dismissal protection on each of them. The reforms allowed a firm to dismiss fixed-term 
contract workers with low or no severance payments, and without advanced notification 
to the unions and the Ministry of Labor. However, the regulations and costs associated 
with the dismissal of workers with permanent contracts barely changed after the reform. 
Not surprisingly, the proportion of temporary jobs increased sharply after these re-
forms. Before the 1984 reform, temporary workers in Spain comprised only 10% of total 
employment and 2% of manufacturing employment. In 1992, these figures were 33% 
and 11%, respectively. Spain has become by far the European country with the highest 
percentage of temporary employment, where temporary contracts represent over 90% of 
hires. This important increase in temporary employment points out that firms have found 
these contracts attractive to reduce firing costs. Nevertheless, this behavior is consistent 
with either positive or negative employment effects of the reform. Evaluating the effects 
of the reform on employment and output requires one to analyze how individual firms' 
hiring and firing decisions have changed after the reform. This is the main objective of 
this paper. 
Identification and Econometric Issues 
If the extensive use of temporary contracts by firms after the reform were completely 
exogenous, a simple way to evaluate its effects could be based on a reduced-form regres-
sion of the variable of interest on the proportion of temporary employment. However, 
the existence of firing costs for permanent workers has made the process of introducing 
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temporary contracts very slow and clearly endogenous. Most firms have not fired perma-
nent workers to hire temporary ones. Instead, they have waited for the arrival of positive 
shocks, and for the retirement of permanent workers, to substitute temporary for per-
manent contracts. Therefore, part of the estimated effect of temporary employment on 
output or total employment in this simple reduced-form approach would be endogenous. 
Furthermore, as we explain in Section 4, it is difficult t.O find instruments for temporary 
employment which are uncorrelated with firms' productivity shocks. 
The limitations of the former approach motivate our consideration of a more structural 
method to evaluate the effects of the reform. We postulate and estimate a dynamic model 
of labor demand with permanent and temporary contracts. The model is similar to the 
ones in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997). Our estima-
tion method comprises two stages. In a first stage we exploit the Markov structure of the 
model to estimate the production function and to obtain fitted values for the productivity 
shock. In the second stage we use the estimated values of productivity shocks as observ-
able, and estimate the rest of structural parameters from the dynamic decision model. 
The method provides consistent estimates of the structural parameters, and avoids the 
problem of auto correlated unobservables in nonlinear models. Our estimation procedure 
of the dynamic decision model is a nested fixed point - maximum likelihood method in 
the spirit of Rust (1987, 1994). 
Given the motivation of the paper, the estimation of hiring and firing costs is partic-
ularly important. The identification of these parameters is based on two predictions of 
the model about hiring and firing costs: (1) they generate persistence in employment or, 
in our case, a positive probability of no change in employment; and (2) they generate a 
wedge between marginal productivity and wage, that is positive when hiring, and nega-
tive when firing. To identify adjustment costs from these statistics we should control for 
autocorrelation in unobservable shocks and for selection bias. Autocorrelation in shocks 
generates persistence in employment, and therefore it can create an upward bias in our 
estimates of adjustment costs. Selection bias results from the fact that firms tend to hire 
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(fire) when the difference between marginal productivity and wage at the beginning of 
the period is positive (negative). Again, this can create an upward bias in our estimates 
of hiring and firing costs. An additional econometric problem stems from the fact that 
we observe net changes in employment, but not gross changes, Le., new contracts, dis-
missals and quits. This is a common problem in most firms' or establislunents' datasets 
(see Hamennesh, 1993, p. 398). However, our dataset contains information on severance 
payments on a firm-year basis. This information makes possible to distinguish between 
those periods where actual dismissals have occurred and those where the negative change 
in employment is the result of workers' retirements or quits. 
The estimation of this structural model presents an additional advantage. Based 
on the estimated model, we can perform experiments which allow us to understand the 
contribution of different factors to the estimated effects of the reform. FUrthermore, we 
can study the effects of hypothetical labor market reforms. 
Summary of Results 
Our estimates of unit firing and promotion costs, based on revealed preference, are 
51% (s.e. = 4.8%) and 10% (s.e. = 4.6%) of the gross annual wage of permanent work-
ers, respectively. It is important to underline that this estimate is significantly larger 
than the one obtained when we do not distinguish between quits and dismissals in neg-
ative employment changes, i.e., 33% (s.e. = 7.7%). Our estimate of the productivity 
differential between permanent and temporary workers is 20% (s.e. = 2.9%). The model 
provides a good fit to the data, and explains the path of job turnover rates and temporary 
employment after the reform. 
Experiments using the estimated model show that, in the steady state, the reform 
increases total employment between 2.5% and 4.5%, and job turnover, between 5 and 7 
percentage points. This increase in total employment is similar to the one associated with 
a reduction in firing costs (for every type of contract) from 50% to 25% of the annual wage. 
Therefore, we obtain important effects of the reform on the level and the variability of 
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employment. However, the effect on output (below 1 %) and on the value of a firm (below 
2%) are very small, and they contrast with the sizable effects associated with a reduction 
in firing costs. Compared with a reduction in firing costs, the introduction of temporary 
contracts leads to excess turnover and employment of low-experience (and hence low 
productivity) workers. This has negative effects on firms' productivity and profits. At 
the maximum duration of a temporary contract, there.is a jump in the marginal cost of 
a worker. This makes firms to dismiss workers that would not be fired if the relationship 
between firing costs and experience were smoother. This result is consistent with Cabrales 
and Hopenhayn (1997), who find a peak in the hazard rate of the duration of contracts 
at the legal limit of a temporary contract. 
Finally, we obtain that firing costs have an important negative effect on Spanish 
employment. According to our estimates, the complete elimination of these costs would 
increase employment around 12%. The effects on output and on the value of a firm are 
also large, Le., 11%and 14%, respectively. However, the effect on employment is nonlinear 
with respect to the size of the reduction in firing costs. Moderate but important reductions 
in firing costs (e.g., from 50% to 40% of the annual wage) lead to negligible effects on 
employment and small effects on output and on the value of a firm. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
In Section 3 we describe our data and present preliminary evidence on the effects of the 
reform. Estimation and econometric issues are discussed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 
present estimation results and experiments, respectively. Concluding remarks are given 
in Section 7. 
The model 
This section presents a labor demand model with two types of labor contracts: fixed-term 
(or temporary) contracts and indefinite-duration (or permanent) contracts. Our model 
builds on Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997). However, the differential in productivity is 
not the result of the introduction of temporary contracts, but of returns to firm-specific 
5  
experience. Before the introduction of temporary contracts there were also experienced  
and unexperienced workers with high and low productivity, respectively. This aspect is  
. important for the evaluation of the productivity effects of the reform. We also incorporate  
hiring costs, promotion costs, and different wages for temporary and permanent contracts.  
These extensions are relevant for our empirical results. 
2.1 Firms' decision problem 
Time is discrete and indexed by t. For the sake of simplicity, we omit in this section the 
firm index. There are two levels of workers' productivity associated with two levels of 
firm-specific experience. Efficiency units of labor depend on the number of experienced 
and unexperienced workers as follows: 
(1) 
where Lt represents efficiency units of labor; nt and mt are the number of workers whose 
experience is lower and higher than T* periods of firm-specific experience, respectively; 
and A E [0,1] is a parameter representing the relative productivity of unexperienced 
workers. Both T* and .>.. are technological parameters, and we assume T* is equal to 1 
period. Therefore, mt is the number of new hirings at period t. 
The production technology of a firm is represented by the production function 
(2) 
where Yt is real output; 'f/t is an idiosyncratic productivity shock; and At is an aggregate 
shock. The function F(.) is continuous and twice differentiable, with FL > 0, Fq > 0, 
FLL < 0, FLq > °and FL(O, 'f/) = +00 for any 'f/. The productivity shocks, 'f/t and At, 
follow first order Markov processes with transitional density functions tP'1('f/t+1I'f/t) and 
q)A(At+dAt ), which are continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments. 
As we said earlier, there are two types of labor contracts, fixed-term (or temporary) 
and indefinite-term (or permanent). Two characteristics distinguish t.emporary and per-
manent contracts in our model. First, firing workers with permanent contracts entails a 
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severance payment, but there are not firing costs associated with the dismissal of tem-
porary workers. Second, a temporary contract is only for one period. After this period, 
the firm should decide whether to dismiss the temporary worker or to promote him to 
a permanent position. Since all unexperienced workers have the same productivity and 
receive the same wage, there is no reason to offer permanent contracts to unexperienced 
workers. Furthermore, the legal limit to the duration of a temporary contract implies 
that it is not possible to have experienced workers with this type of contract. Therefore, 
in the model with temporary contracts, nt and mt represent permanent and temporary 
employment at period t, respectively. 
The firm decides new temporary contracts, mt, prQmotions of temporary workers to 
permanent positions, ht, and dismissals of permanent workers, ft. Therefore, the number 
of permanent workers at period t is: 
(3) 
The firm faces costs of hiring, firing and promoting workers. We consider linear adjustment 
costs as in Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1992), and Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
(1993), among others, but distinguish between hiring costs and promotion costs. 
(4) 
where BH ~ 0 is the unit hiring cost; BP ~ 0 is the unit cost of promotion; and BF ~ 0 is 
the cost of firing permanent workers. A third component of the profit function is the wage 
bill, w~nt + Wrmt, where wf and wr are the wages of experienced and unexperienced 
workers, respectively. For the moment, we assume that the vector of wages Wt = (w~, 
w;"')' follows a first order Markov process with transition density function <Pw(Wt+llwt)' 
that is continuous and twice differentiable. 
At period t, the firm knows the initial stocks of workers, nt-l and mt-l' technological 
shocks, and wages, and it decides hirings, promotions and dismissals to maximize the 
expected discOlmted stream of current and future profits. There is uncertainty about 
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future technological shocks and wages. Therefore, the decision problem at period t is: 
00 
Et Lf3j ITt+j (5) 
j=O 
where the firm's one-period profit is: 
(6) 
and f3 E (0,1) is the discount factor. It is straightforward to see that the vector of state 
variables in this problem is St = (nt-b mt-b Wt, 17t, At)'. However, if (OP +OF) > 0, a firm 
will never promote temporary workers and fire permanent workers simultaneously. This 
implies that the decision about permanent workers can be represented in terms of the net 
change fit =ht - ft, where It = -I(dt < O)dt and ht = I(dt > O)dt • Therefore, the profit 
function can be re-written as: 
(7) 
Under previous assumptions this decision problem is stationary Markov, and value 
function and optimal decision rules are time invariant (Le., Blackwell's Theorem holds). 
Since the decision problem does not depend on calendar time, we omit for the rest of this 
section the subindex t, and use N and M to denote nt-l and mt-b respectively. The 
Bellman's equation of this problem is: 
V(S) = max 7r(s,d, m) +f3 EV(N+d,m,w,17,A) (8)
{m~O i d::;M} 
where V (.) is the value function, and EV (.) is the expected next period value function: 
EV(N + d, m, w, 17, A) = JV (N + d, m, w', 17', A') <Pw(dw'lw) <Pl1(d17'I17) <PA(dA'IA) (9) 
2.2 Optimal decision rule 
To characterize the solu.tion of this model we make the simplifying assumption that the 
constraint d ::; M is never binding. That is, there are always enough temporary workers to 
be promoted to permanent positions. This assumption simplifies very much t.he solution 
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of the model, and it is strongly supported by our data.2 Implicitly we are assuming that 
the probability of promotion is so low that intertemporal considerations play a very minor 
role in the decision about temporary workers. In terms of the parameters of the model, 
this condition holds (with probability close to one) if (wm+f)H)j'\ is small enough relative 
to wn + f)P. Under this simplifying assumption, the stock of temporary workers is not a 
state variable, Le., s = (N, w, f), AY. 
Lemma 1 presents the characterization of the optimal decision rule. Before, we intro-
duce the following definitions: 
_ _ wm + f)Hm m*L*(W ,f}, A) : FL (L* ,f}, A) - w = ,\ (10) 
and: 
where EVn (.) is the partial derivative, with respect to permanent employment, of the 
expected value function. We prove in Appendix 1 that the value function is differentiable 
at any point, and therefore this partial derivative exists. L* is the optimal employment 
level if all contracts were temporary, but with permanents' productivity. Gn(n, w, f}, A) 
is the intertemporal marginal profit with respect to permanent employment, gross of 
current adjustment costs, and once we have taken into account the decision for temporary 
employment. 
LEMMA 1: Optimal decision rule 
The problem in equation (8) has a unique solution with the following optimal decision 
function: 
(12) 
2For 98% of the observations with positive temporary employment at period t 1, (nt -nt-l) is lower 
than mt-l. Obviously, that is not the case for firms with zero temporary employment. However, the 
proportion of these firms was small in 1993 (lower than 16%) and, according to our model, it should be 
zero in the steady-state. 
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and: 
m"(s) = { 0* {L"(wm , t], A) - N - d"(s)} 	 if L"(wm , t], A) > N + d"(s) (13) 
if L"(wm , t], A) ::; N + d"(s) 
wmwhere L"(.), nF(.), and nP(.) are implicitly defined by the expressions: FL(L", t], A) = .. ; 
Gn(nP,w,t],A) = (JP; and Gn(nF,w,t],A) = _(JF. 
Proof: 
See Appendix 1. 
The interpretation of this decision rule is simple. nP and nF represent the optimallev-
els of permanent employment when the firm decides to increase and decrease, respectively, 
this type of contracts. Equation (12) shows that it is optimal to hire permanent workers 
if, given the level of permanent employment at the beginning of the period, the intertem-
poral marginal profit when promoting workers, net of adjustment costs, is greater than 
zero. Alternatively, it is optimal to fire permanent workers if the intertemporal marginal 
profit when firing, net of adjustment costs, is lower than zero. Otherwise, the optimal 
decision is not to change permanent employment. 
The optimal decision rule without temporary contracts would be: 
(14) 
where: 
(15) 
The introduction of temporary contracts has several effects on permanent employment. 
On the one hand, the firm takes account of promotion costs, (JP, instead of hiring costs (JH 
in the decision to increase permanent employment. If (JP < (JH, this effect contributes to 
increase the level of permanent employment and its sensitivity with respect to wages and 
productivity shocks. On the other hand, for n < L", FL(L"',t],A)+wm" < FL(n,t],A), so 
that the marginal intertemporal profit Gn is shifted downwards, and the slope of Gn is 
lower than in the absence of temporary contracts. This has a negative effect on the level 
and flexibility of permanent employment, and therefore the overall effect on permanent 
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employment is ambiguous. In most of our simulations, and particularly in those based 
on the estimated parameters of the model, we obtain that the second effect dominates 
the first, i.e., the introduction of temporary contracts reduces the level and flexibility of 
permanent employment. The effect on total employment is ambiguous, and it is closely 
related to the effect of firing costs on employment. 
2.3 	 Two alternative reforms: reduction in firing costs and in-
troduction of temporary contracts 
We conclude this section presenting some numerical solutions of the model. These numer-
ical examples illustrate how the effects of two alternative labor market reforms depend 
on the values of some structural parameters. We consider a Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
(16) 
The productivity shock follows an AR(I) process with autoregresive parameter p and 
variance of the innovation u~. For simplicity, we assume that wages are constant (i.e., 
there are not aggregate supply or demand shocks, and the economy is in steady-state). 
Figures 1 to 3 present the effects on employment and output of different reductions in 
nfiring costs in the absence of temporary contracts. We fix aD = 1.4, aL = 0.666, w = 1.0, 
and Ua = 0.20. The initial level of the unit dismissal cost is 60% of the wage rate. 
We consider several values for the persistence of productivity shock, p, and for hiring 
costs, eH. In Figures 1 and 2 we present the effect on employment, and the effect on 
output in Figure 3. First, for any value of p and eH, the change in employment depends 
nonlinearly on the magnitude of the reduction in firing costs. Moderate reductions in 
firing costs reduce employment, but larger reductions can increase it. Second, the change 
in employment after the reform is very sensitive to the values of eH and, particularly, of p. 
The lower the hiring costs and the larger the persistence of productivity shocks, the larger 
the increase in employment. These figures illustrate the importance of having accurate 
estimates of these parameters in order to evaluate the employment effects of this type 
of reform. Howeyer, for a wide range of values of the structural parameters, we obtain 
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that reductions in dismissal costs lead to sizable positive effects on output (see Figure 3). 
That is the case even when the reform has modest effects on employment. This finding 
is consistent with the results in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). 
In Figures 4 and 5 we present an example of the employment effects of introducing 
temporary contracts. We fix 0:0 = 1.4, O:L = 0.666, (Ta = 0.20, p = 0.80, OH = oP = 0, 
wmOF = 0.60 X wn , and wn = = 1, and solve the model for different values of A. From 
examination of these figures we can assert that, to observe fairly large increases in em-
ployment, there should be a significant substitution of temporary contracts by permanent 
contracts. Any rise in the employment level above 3% requires a proportion of temporary 
employment of at least 20%. Nevertheless, as we illustrate in Section 6, the output gains 
from a reform which entails a fairly large proportion of temporary employment are much 
smaller than the ones associated with a reduction in firing costs. 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data and variables 
The main data set has been taken from the database of the Balance Sheets of the Bank 
of Spain (CBBE hereafter). This database contains annual information on the balance 
sheets and other complementary information on economic variables for a large number of 
Spanish companies. Our sample is an unbalanced panel with 2356 manufacturing firms 
between 1982 and 1993. The firms included in this sample represent 40% of total Spanish 
manufacturing value added during the period. Appendix 2 describes the variables used in 
this paper and presents the sample distribution of the firms by industry and size. Here we 
concentrate our discussion on the construction of three important variables: temporary 
employment, wages, and gross changes in permanent employment. 
The CBBE contains information, on a firm-year basis, of the number of workers by 
type of contract (temporary or permanent) and of the average duration (in weeks) of tem-
porary contracts. To maintain measurement consistency, we have calculated temporary 
employment in annual terms by multiplying the number of temporary employees along 
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the year times the average nwnber of weeks worked by temporary employees and divided 
by 52. 
CBBE reports the firm's total wage bill (which allows to calculate the average wage 
rate for total employees at the firm-level), but the wage rate for each type of contract is 
not reported. We use two datasets to obtain information of wages by type of contract: the 
Wage Distribution Survey (Distribuci6n Salarial en Esp~fi.a, DS hereafter), and the Labor 
Force Survey (Encuesta PHoto de la EPA, 1987, EPA hereafter). DS reports average 
wages of permanent and temporary employees at 2-digit industry level (21 industries in 
our data) and by firm size classes (3 groups). EPA is a large micro dataset of the Spanish 
labor force. Unfortunately, information on wages is only available for the 1987 EPA, and 
therefore we only have one cross-section of individual wages. 
Most firms' or establishments' datasets have information on net employment changes, 
but not on gross employment changes, Le., firings, hirings, and voluntary quits. That is 
also the case in our data. This is an important limitation if one thinks that most labor 
adjustment costs are associated with firings and hirings but not with quits. In particular, 
ignoring this problem implies that many negative changes in permanent employment 
which are the result of workers' voluntary quits will be treated as costly dismissals. Since 
our estimates of adjustment costs are based on revealed preference, this overestimation 
of the frequency and amount of firings will lead to an underestimation of firing costs. 
This has serious implications on the evaluation of the effects of a reduction in firing costs. 
However, the availability of information about severance payments in our data (on a firm-
year basis) allows us to provide a solution to this problem. Using this variable we can 
identify when there have actually occurred workers' dismissals.3 
Table 1 presents the joint distribution of two discrete variables: the sign of the net 
change in permanent employment, and the indicator for the existence of severance pay-
3Under the Spanish regulation, a permanent worker is entitled to severance payments even if he/she 
has been working in the firm for only one year. During our sample period, the compensation was 45 days 
of pay per year of tenure. Although a worker is not entitled to this compensation in the case of causal 
dismissal, Spanish regulation was very narrow in the definition of this concept. For instance, dismissals 
for economic reasons were not considered as causaL Furthermore, labor courts tend mostly to decide in 
favor of the worker. Therefore, almost any dismissal implies a severance payment. 
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ments. CBBE reports information on severance payments between 1986 and 1990. The 
frequency of no change in permanent employment is relatively large (about 19%).4 This 
shows the existence of important persistence in permanent employment, what is consis-
tent with our assumption of kinked adjustment costs. The frequency of job destructions 
(40.9%) is very similar to the frequency of job creations (40.3%). However, the high 
proportion of job destructions contrasts with the much:smaller frequency of positive sev-
erance payments (24.9%). More than two-thirds of the observations with negative changes 
in permanent employment are associated with zero severance payments. It seems plausi-
ble to consider that these cases result from workers' voluntary quits, and, in particular, 
retirements. Therefore, the substitution of temporary contracts by indefinite contracts 
has been mostly associated with voluntary attrition of permanent workers. As we will 
show in Section 5, not taking this into account implies serious biases in the estimates of 
adjustment costs. 
Under the assumption that there are not voluntary quits, the construction of gross 
changes in employment is: hit = I(l1nit > O)l1nit, and fit = -I(l1nit < O)l1nit, where 
.l:lnu is the net change in permanent employment for firm i at period t. In this paper we 
exploit information on severance payments to relax this assumption. In particular, not 
all negative changes in employment are interpreted as dismissals. We consider: 
hit = I(l1nit > O)l1nit , 

fit = -I(l1nit < 0 ; SPit> O)l1nit (17)  
Qit = -I(l1nit < 0 ; SPit = O)l1nit 

where SPit represents severance payments of firm i at period t, and Qit represents voluntary 
quits. We obtain estimates of our model using these measures as well as the ones that do 
not take into account the information of severance payments. 
Using the previous definition of hirings, firings and voluntary quits, we can obtain 
measures of workers' quit rates and severance payments per worker. These statistics give 
us an indication of whether our measures of severance payments and voluntary quits are 
consistent with aggregate figures from other datasets. Table 2 presents the median of these 
4Notice that these are actually zeros in the first difference of permanent employment. 
14  
variables between 1986 and 1990. The median quit rate, very similar to the one obtained 
from the Labor Force Survey (EPA), reflects the low workers' turnover in the Spanish 
economy. The severance payment per worker is between 56% and 78% of the annual gross 
wage of permanent workers in the firm. For those firms who are firing permanent workers 
(those with positive severance payments), the cost of severance payments amounts to 
0.7% of annual sales. Finally, given that the regulated severance payment is 45 days of 
pay per year of tenure, the median job experience of a dismissed worker is between 4.5 
and 6.2 years. 
One might be tempted to use the severance payments per worker in Table 2 as an 
estimate of (JF in our model. However, we observe severance payments only for those 
firms who decide to dismiss workers. If firms differ in the distribution of (firm-specific) 
I 
experience of their workers, and therefore in their marginal firing costs, there would be I 
I a selection bias associated with the estimate in Table 2. That is, we observe that firms 
tend to dismiss more workers if they face relatively small firing costs. This selection bias 
implies a downward bias in the estimate of the average marginal firing cost (JF. The 
estimates of labor adjustment costs that we use to evaluate the effects of the reform are 
based on the principle of revealed preference and on the structure of our model. 
3.2 Trends in Spanish manufacturing employment, 1982-93 
Table 3 reports the path of several statistics related to firms' activity in our sample. 
The evolution of real output growth shows that the period 1982-1993 covers an expan-
sion, 1986-1989, and a recession 1990-1993. However, the number and the proportion 
of permanent employees have monotonically decreased along the sample period. The 
new regulation of temporary contracts was introduced in November 1984. Temporary 
employment has experienced a sharp growth from 1986 to 1990. Although temporary 
employment decreased from 1990 to 1993, its share in total employment rose from 2.89 
per cent in 1985 to 9.72 per cent in 1993. 
Table 3 presents also job creation and job destruction rates for permanent and tem-
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porary employment using the statistics proposed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).5 The 
small job turnover rates for permanent employment contrasts with the very high rates for 
temporary employment. This is a simple but strong evidence of how firing costs can have 
very important effects on job turnover rates. The job turnover rates for total employment 
are smaller than the ones reported by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) for several 
countries. A reason for this difference is that our stat~stics are based on firm level data 
instead of plant level data. 
In Table 4 we decompose the job destruction rates of permanent employment in firings 
and voluntary quits for the sample period at which severance payments were available. 
Almost 50% of the destruction of permanent jobs between 1986 and 1990 has been asso-
ciated with workers' voluntary quits. The large firing costs have compelled firms to wait 
until the retirement of permanent workers to substitute them with temporary employees. 
This explains the relatively slow process of adjustment to the new steady-state. 
3.3 	 Wage differential between permanent and temporary work-
ers 
One of our concerns is the within-firm wage differential between temporary and perma-
nent workers. The wage differential at the aggregate or industry level captures also the 
correlation between firms' utilization of temporary workers and firms' wages. For instance, 
the proportion of temporary workers might be lower in those firms paying higher salaries. 
We want to control for this correlation. 
Table 5 presents estimates of the within-firm wage differential between permanent 
and temporary workers using the EPA and eBBE datasets. The first panel contains 
a decomposition of the wage differential based on the estimation of a logarithmic wage 
equation using workers' micro data from the EPA, which includes human capital variables 
as well as industry dummies. The average log wage differential in this dataset is 0.427, 
and the contribution of observable human capital variables is 0.259. Age and firm-specific 
experience explain almost 50% of the whole differential. Our estimate of the average 
5Notice that these statistics are based on net changes in employment. Le., .6.nit. 
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return of an additional year of firm-specific experience is 0.080 (0.016), that is a bit 
larger than the one in Topel (1991). However, industry dummies have also an important 
contribution. Therefore, the proportion of temporary workers tend to be lower in those 
industries (and probably firms) that pay higher salaries. 
The second panel presents empirical evidence about the wage differential using the 
CBBE firms' dataset. The idea behind these estimations is that the average wage in 
a firm depends negatively on the proportion of temporary workers. In particular, it is 
simple to show that the logarithm of the average wage in firm i at period t is equal 
to In(wft) + (1 - 1")mit/(mit + nit), where 1" is the wage differential between permanent 
and temporary workers. Since we do not observe In(wft) at the individual-firm level, 
we control for this variable using time dummies interacted with industry dummies, and 
firms' real output. We also control for firm-specific effects applying either within-firms 
or first differences transformations; in the latter case, we use an instrumental variable 
procedure. In any case, the estimate of 1" is very robust to the inclusion of real output or 
to the transformation and estimation method. Furthermore, the size of this estimate is 
very similar to the contribution of human capital variables in the top panel. Very similar 
results are obtained when we allow the wage differential to vary over time: in that case, 
the estimates range from 0.272 (0.031) in 1992 to 0.311 (0.031) in 1986. There is thus no 
evidence of changes in the wage differential over the sample period, which is consistent 
with the evidence from aggregate data in the 1988-1992 DS dataset. 
4 Estimation of the structural model 
4.1 The econometric model 
Consider a firms' panel dataset with information on output, employment, and wages, 
{Nit, dit , mu, Yit, Wit: i = 1, ... , I; t = I, ... , Ti}. Let Bbe the vector of structural parameters 
of the model, B = {ex,>..,BH,BP,BF ,(3, w}, where ex are technological parameters in the 
production function; and Ware the parameters in the transition probabilities of the state 
variables. We incorporate an additional state variable, eit, that represents a variable cost 
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for permanent employment. Therefore, labor costs associated with permanent workers 
are (wit + eit)nit. The state variable eit is unobservable from the point of view of the 
econometrician, and it can be interpreted as costs associated with monitoring workers 
and with the welfare of workers in the jobplace. We assume that eit is iid with mean 
ILl!: and variance er;. Our motivation to include this variable is twofold. First, if there 
is an additional labor cost with mean different to zero (ILl!: :f. 0) but we do not take it 
into account, our estimate of (JP + (JF will be biased. More specifically, we would be 
estimating (JP + (JF + ILl!:, and therefore either firing costs, or promotion costs, or both, 
would be biased. Second, this additional labor cost is not constant and it thus allows us 
to avoid an unsaturated specification, Le., a deterministic relationship between observable 
variables. 
Our econometric model consists on the production function, 
(18) 
the marginal condition of optimality for temporary employment, 
(19) 
the marginal conditions of optimality for permanent employment, 
(20) 
and the optimal discrete choice for permanent employment, 
The unobservables in this model are {17it, eiLl Ad. 
To estimate this model we proceed in two stages. In the first stage we estimate the 
production ftmct.ion, and the optimal decision for permanent workers in the second stage. 
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We use this two-stage approach for two reasons. First, the estimation of the production 
function is relatively standard. In particular, we need not solve the dynamic programming 
modeL Second, and more importantly, in equations (20) and (21) we have an unobservable 
variable which is autocorrelated, Le., T}it. Dealing with this issue in a nonlinear model 
requires to face the well known problem of initial conditions for the unobservables (see 
Heckman, 1981). In the context of our censored dynamic programming model, this is not 
only computationally very costly, but it usually implies important identification problems. 
Our approach exploits the invertibility of the production function with respect to the 
productivity shock. In particular, we use data on output and inputs to obtain consistent 
estimates of the productivity shock, and we use these statistics as 'bbservables" in our 
estimation of the dynamic programming modeL This strategy provides consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimates, and it has been used, in two different contexts, by 
Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1995) and Olley and Pakes (1996). 
Before we enter in the details of our econometric approach, it is worthwhile to give 
a brief and stylized description of this method. Let Xit = (Nit, du, mit, Wit, Yit)' be the 
vector of variables for firm i at period t. Under certain assumptions about the stochastic 
structure of T}it (see subsection 4.2 below) it is possible to obtain moment conditions 
from the production function to estimate the vector of technological parameters and the 
distribution of the technological shock, Le., Bl = (0:', A, p, O'~). Using the equations for the 
optimal decision of permanent employment, and conditioning on Xit and T}it, it is possible 
to obtain a set of moment conditions: 
(22) 
where the expected value is taken over the distribution of eit, and the vector B2 contains 
the rest of parameters which are not included in B1• Now, if the production function 
is strictly monotonic in the productivity shock, we can invert this function to obtain, 
T}it = !(Xiti Bd· Therefore, we can re-write the previous moment conditions as follows: 
(23) 
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We use a sequential approach to estimate (Ob ( 2 ). First, we estimate 01 using the moment 
conditions from the production function. Then, we solve our estimate 01 in h, and use the 
moment conditions in (23) to estimate O2• We use the results in Newey (1984) to obtain 
the covariance matrix of O2 taking into account the sequential nature of the procedure. 
The rest of this section describes in more detail the two stages. 
4.2 First stage: Estimation of technological parameters 
The specification of the production function is a Cobb-Douglas in terms of capital and 
efficiency units of labor. For firm i at period t: 
(24) 
It is well known that the OL8 estimation of this equation suffers of endogeneity bias 
In particular, contemporaneous values of inputs are correlated with the unobservable 
productivity shock. Furthermore, if the T/it are auto correlated, lagged values of inputs 
and output are also correlated with the unobservable. Our identification strategy exploits 
the time persistence in the demand of permanent workers and the Markov structure of the 
unobservable shocks. We consider the following stochastic structure for the idiosyncratic 
shock: T/it = l5i + Uit, where l5i represents a time-invariant and firm-specific effect, and Uit 
follows an autoregresive process, Uit = [JUi,t-l + ait with ait '" iid N(O, lT~). Therefore, we 
can obtain the following transformation of the previous equation: 
~lnYit - p ~lnYi,t-l + aKlnKit - paK lnKi,t-l (25)+ aL(~ In[nit + A mit] - P ~ In[ni,t-l + A mi,t-l]) + It + ~ait 
where ~ is the time difference operator; and It is an aggregate effect, that depends 
on At, At-I, and At - 2• If ait is iid, values of inputs and output at period t - 2 and 
earlier are orthogonal to ~ait. We can thus exploit such orthogonality conditions to 
estimate {aL' A, p} and the I's by GMM. The existence of adjustment costs associated 
with t.he demand of permanent employment implies that lagged values of inputs can be 
good predict.ors of current permanent employment. 
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However, this approach has a limitation in our model. Since there is very low persis-
tence in temporary employment, we do not have good instruments (in the sense of good 
predictors) for this variable. This problem results into an imprecise estimate of A. For 
this reason, we exploit the marginal conditions for temporary employment to estimate A. 
In Yit = const + In(nit + A mit) + In w~ + J.Li + eit (26) 
The error terms in this equation, Ti and eit, represent measurement error in wages and 
output. Notice that the main empirical prediction that we exploit to identify A is that, if 
A < 1, temporary employment reduces the marginal productivity of labor. We estimate A 
using a within-groups nonlinear least squares estimator. We plug this estimate in equation 
(25) and then estimate aK, aL, and p by GMM. 
4.3 Second stage: Dynamic decision model 
In the context of our model, the existence of kinked adjustment costs has two empirical 
implications: (1) the difference between marginal productivity of labor and wage should 
be larger when hiring than when firing; and (2) there should be a positive probability 
of no change in permanent employment. The larger the job turnover costs, the larger 
the probability of inaction and the larger the differential between marginal productivities 
when firing and hiring. Both predictions are important to identify the parameters associ-
ated with job turnover costs. However, the Euler equations do not exploit the prediction 
about the probability of inaction. A second problem associated with the Euler equations 
approach is that they only hold for the subsample of interior solutions. Therefore, there 
is a potential sample selection bias. For instance, for the subsample of observations where 
firms are firing, the unobservable variable cost Cit is conditional to dit < 0, and therefore 
it is correlated with observable state variables. In principle, one can control for this se-
lection bias by using reduced form estimates of the discrete choice. However, there are 
potential gains of efficiency in our estimates of structural parameters if the structural 
model is exploited to estimate this discrete choice. Furthermore, our structural model 
implies exclusion restrictions which are important for identification in the context of a 
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sample selection problem. 6 
We propose and implement an econometric approach that combines several results 
from the literature of estimation of dynamic programming discrete choice models. Let 
Xu = (Wih TJit, At), and define: 
M Pit is the marginal profit (gross of adjustment costs) of permanent employment for firm 
i at period t. Let M pR = M P(Nit, Xit), that is M PR is marginal profit if permanent 
employment at period t were equal to its value at the beginning of the period. Given 
our estimates of G.L and A in the first stage, we can obtain consistent estimates of M ~t 
and M pR. Now, according to our specification of the production function, the optimal 
decision for permanent employment can be re-written as: 
(/-le: + BP) - BH lu - f3 EVn(nit, Xit; B) + cit if dit > 0  
MPit = (27) { (/-le: - BF) - BH lu - f3 EVn(nit, xiti B) + cit if dit < 0  
and: 
dit > 0 if 
dit = 0 if 
dit < 0 if 
where Cit = Cit - /-le:; I;;: = I(Lit > nit), and 1;;:° = I(Lit > Nit). We assume that 
cit rv iidN(O, oD. Apart from the nonlinear function EVn(.i B), the log-likelihood of this 
model is very standard. It is a switching regression model where the discrete part consists 
of an ordered probit. We estimate (/-le, (je, BH, BP, BF, (3) by partial maximum likelihood. 
Notice that in a myopic model (f3 = 0) we can identify BP + BF, but we cannot identify 
BP, BF, and /-le separately. However, if f3 > 0 we can identify all the parameters in the 
model (see Appendix 3). 
6Given the structure of adjustment costs in our model, the discrete choice depends on employment at 
the beginning of the period, but the continuous choice does not depend on this variable. 
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il The main computational issue in this maximum likelihood estimation is to obtain 
\ the expected marginal value function EVn (.). The following Lemma presents a useful 
li expression for EVn (.). 
I'
],I 
I LEMMA 2:I
EVn(n,x) - (JP E(pP[n,x'] I n,x) - (JF E(pF[n,x'J I n,x)
11 
11 (29)1 
+ E( J{d*[s'] = O} {MP[n,x/] - c' + ,8EVn[n,x']} In,x) 
where pP (n, x) and pF(n, x) are the probabilities of promotion and firing, respectively, 
conditional on (n, x) and integrating over the distribution of c. 
pp(n,x) = Pr(d*[s] > 0 I n,x) pF (n, x) = Pr(d*[s] < 0 In, x) 
Equation (29) is a contraction mapping in EVn(.). 

Proof:  
See Appendix 1.  
Given t.his Lemma, it is possible to estimate (J by Maximum Likelihood using a nested 
fixed point algorithm (Rust, 1987, 1994). However, such algorithm requires to solve the 
dynamic programming problem (fixed point) as many times as the number of iterations 
in our search for the ML estimates. When the dimension of the space of state variables 
is relatively large, as it is in our case, this is computationally very demanding. For this 
reason, we use an alternative algorithm, proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (1998), 
to obtain the partial MLE.7 The main idea of this algorithm is to obtain a sequence of 
pseudo maximum likelihood est.imators based on approximations to the marginal value 
function. Given one of these pseudo maximum likelihood estimators, the approximation 
to the value function is updated, and a new pseudo maximum likelihood estimator is 
obtained using the new approximation. In the limit, the approximation becomes the true 
marginal value function and the pseudo MLE is the actual partial MLE. This approach 
reduces very much the number of policy iterations needed to estimate the model (e.g., in 
7It is a partial MLE because the transition probabilities of the state variables are estimated separately 
in a first stage. 
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this paper we need only 5 policy iterations to estimate the model). The reduction in the 
number of policy iterations is at the expense of a larger number of hill-climbing iterations 
to obtain the pseudo MLE, but these are computationally much cheaper when the state 
space is relatively large. Appendix 3 describes this algorithm in more detail. 
5 Estimation results 
5.1 Estimation of technological parameters 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the technological parameters. The top panel contains 
estimates of ,\ using the marginal conditions of optimality for temporary employment. 
Since we do not observe the wage of temporary workers at the firm level, we use the 
aggregate wage at industry-firm size level. We perform within-firm estimation to control 
for endogeneity due to omitted heterogeneity in firms' wages. Furthermore, we control 
for endogenous firms' exit by means of a second order polynomial in the estimated prob-
abilities of exit. These probabilities have been estimated using a probit model where the 
explanatory variables are the observable state variables and time and industry dummies. 
Our estimate of ,\ shows that the productivity of a temporary worker is on average 80% 
of the productivity of a permanent worker. This estimate of ,\ is very precise and robust. 
In particular, we obtain very similar estimates of ,\ when we use time dummies interacted 
with industry dummies instead of our aggregate measure of In(wa), or when we allow ,\ 
to vary over time. 
It is interesting to compare this value of ,\ with our estimate of the wage differential in 
Table 5. According to these estimates, the wage ratio between permanent and temporary 
workers is very close to the ratio of their relative productivities, i.e., wn /wm = 1.26 and 
1/A= 1.25. Why are permanent workers employed if they are more expensive than tem-
porary workers even after we adjust for their productivities? There are several potential 
explanations. One is that there might exist certain complementarity between permanent 
and temporary workers. However, estimates of the production function allowing for this 
complementarity show that it is very small and not significant. A second possible ex-
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planation is that the current situation is not an equilibrium: in the long run, both the 
amount and the wage of permanent workers will have to come down. But the facts do 
not support this hypothesis. The relative wage has been stable during the sample period. 
The share of permanents workers in manufacturing employment continued its decline after 
1993, but since 1996 it has become stable (around 80% in the manufacturing industry and 
66% percent in the whole economy). Finally, a third potential explanation is based on 
hiring costs associated with temporary employment. Since temporary workers' turnover 
is very high (due to the existence of a legal limit to the duration of temporary contracts), 
even moderate values of ()H might explain the high share of permanent employment. 
The bottom panel in Table 6 presents GMM estimates of the production function, 
using lags of output and inputs from t - 2 to t - 4 as instruments. We exploit all the 
possible sequential moment conditions for this set of instruments (see Arellano and Bond, 
1991). The specification tests do not present evidence against the specification and the 
choice of instrumental variables. Tests of autocorrelation in the first-difference of the 
residuals (statistics ml and m2) show no evidence of second order autocorrelation, and 
therefore lags t - 2 to t - 4 of endogenous variables are valid instruments. Furthermore, 
the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is relatively high. 
Finally, the null hypothesis of no selection bias due to endogenous exit is clearly rejected. 
The first column presents unrestricted estimates of the production function parame-
ters (Le., lmrestricted >., and no constant returns to scale). The parameter estimates are 
not very precise, particularly in the case for >.. This parameter is associated with the 
proportion of temporary workers, and this variable is weakly instrumented. Furthermore, 
the estimate of CiK seems to be downward biased, which is a common result in the litera-
ture on estimation of production functions (see Griliches and Mairesse, 1995, for a recent 
survey of this literature). Therefore, we also estimate the production function imposing 
constant returns to scale and our estimate of >. in the top panel of Table 6. Not very 
surprisingly, the specification is not rejected and we obtain more precise estimates for the 
rest of parameters of interest. Our estimates of the persistence and the standard deviation 
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of the idiosyncratic shock, i.e., p and O'a, are very precise. It is important to underline 
that those specifications with, either uncorrelated shocks or without firm-specific fixed 
effects, were clearly rejected. In both cases the residuals were serially autocorrelated and 
the overidentifying restrictions were strongly rejected. 
5.2 Estimation of the dynamic decision model 
Table 7 presents partial maximum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters 
{OH, OP, OF, PE' O'E}' These estimates are obtained using a discount factor equal to 0.95, 
that corresponds to a 5.3% annual interest rate.8 We report estimates of four different 
specifications, with and without voluntary quits; and with homogeneity and heterogene-
ity in employment adjustment costs. In the specification with homogeneous costs, we 
consider labor adjustment costs at period t to be proportional to the aggregate average 
wage at that period: 
nH _ ,l..H w-m • (JP _ ,l..P w-n • nF _ ,l..F w-m 
Ut - If' t, t - If' t, Ut - If' t 
In the specification with heterogeneous costs, labor adjustment costs for a certain firm 
are proportional to the firm-level wage: 
In both cases, we report estimates of <pH, <pP, and <pF.9 
The consideration of heterogeneous adjustment costs does not have important effects 
on the estimates, either with or without quits. The firing cost parameter seems slightly 
downward biased in the model with homogeneous costs, and the estimate of O'E drops 
down when we consider heterogeneity. But, apart from O'E' the parameters do not change 
significantly. The goodness-of-fit (likelihood ratio index) improves when we consider het-
SOur estimate of {J in the unrestricted model was 0.916 (s.e. = 0.085). This estimate is too small 
compared to the real interest rates during the sample period (between 3% and 6%). However, our 
estimates of the remaining parameters barely changed for values of {J between 0.86 and 0.98. 
9Estimates of wages of permanent and temporary workers at the firm level were obtained using the 
average firm's wage, the proportion of temporary workers, and the estimated wage differential 'T = 1.26. 
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erogeneous costs, though this is something that we would expect when we introduce 
additional variability in the explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between costly and non costly separations increases very 
significantly the estimate of the firing cost parameter. It is important to notice that the 
goodness of fit of the model improves importantly when we consider voluntary quits. That 
is, the model explains better the discrete dependent V&riable which exploits information 
on severance payments to define firings. When voluntary quits were assumed out, we do 
not find significant differences between hiring and promotion costs, what would imply 
that hiring costs would be lower than promotion costs in monetary terms. 
The point estimates for the unit firing cost and the unit promotion cost are 51.1% 
and 9.8% of the gross annual wage of permanent workers, respectively. This firing cost is 
i,I 
I' 
sizeable, though slightly lower than the average severance payment per worker in Table 
I 2. The unit hiring cost is 15.9% of the annual wage of temporary workers. In monetary 
i i terms, this is very close to the unit promotion cost. The model provides a good fit to 
I the data, with a likelihood ratio index close to 30%. Furthermore, the paths of aggregate 
: I variables from simulations of the estimated model match very well the observed paths 
, 1 
,[ 
! i during the sample period, i.e., aggregate employment, proportion of temporary workers, 
, 1 
and job turnover rates of permanent and temporary workers. 
1 
I 
6 Experiments 
We use the estimated model to evaluate the effects, on employment, job turnover, pro-
ductivity and firm's value, of the introduction of temporary contracts. We also compare 
these effects with those associated with a halving in firing costs for all type of workers. 
The following parameters are the same in the pre- and post- reform models. 
n,B = 0.95 ; ,\ = 0.795 ; OF = 0.511 *wn ; w = 3.07 ; 
00 = 2.96 ; P = 0.691 ; OH = 0.159 *wm ; wn /wm = 1.26 ; 
OL = 0.698; U a = 0.196 ; 
In the model without temporary contracts, the promotion cost is zero, and the firing 
cost for unexperienced workers is (j>Fm = (j>F = 0.511. In the model with temporary 
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contracts, </JFm is zero, and the promotion cost is </>P = 0.098. In both cases we consider 
the same relative productivity between experienced and lUlexperienced workers, Le., A = 
0.795. Fmthermore, we assume that the reform does not affect the relative wage of 
experienced and lUlexperienced workers. 
Table 8 presents the results of these experiments. The introduction of temporary 
contracts had important positive effects on employment (3.7% increase) and job turnover 
(5.8 percentage points increase). The effect on employment is very similar to the one from 
a 50% reduction in firing costs. However, while the introduction of temporary contracts 
had small effects on output and firm's value (0.9% and 1.6% increases, respectively), 
these effects appear to be very important in the case of the reduction in firing costs (3.9% 
and 5.6%, respectively). Compared with the reduction in firing costs, the introduction 
of temporary contracts implies an excess of unexperienced workers (19.5% versus 9.8%) 
and therefore a reduction in average productivity. Furthermore, temporary contracts 
lead to an excess turnover of unexperienced workers. In particular, the number of hirings 
with temporary workers is more than twice the amount of hirings under the hypothetical 
reduction in firing costs. This fact also contributes to a smaller increase in the value of 
finns. 
How sensitive are these effects to small changes in the parameters? To answer this 
question, we have solved the model (i.e., the benchmark model and the two experiments) 
for fifty random draws of the vector of parameters in a 99% confidence region arolUld the 
point estimates of eH, ePand eF. Notice that, since we are fixing the rest of parameters, 
this is a 'worst case scenario" for our uncertainty about the effects of the reform. In 
particular, the proportion of temporary employment and the employment effects of the 
introduction of temporary workers are very sensitive to the value of the ratio Awn/ (wm+ 
eH). But, given this ratio, the sensitivity of the effects of the reform to particular values 
of A, eH and wn /wm is very low. The fact that we have not taken into accolUlt the 
covariance between the estimates of A, eH and wn / wm implies that we are overestimating 
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our uncertainty about the effects of the reform. IO We find that the effects on job turnover 
are quite robust, i.e., between 4.8 and 7.1 percentage points. This is also the case for the 
effect on employment of a reduction in firing costs (an increase between 2.3% and 4.1%). 
As we have mentioned, the proportion of temporary employment and the employment 
effects of the introduction of temporary workers are very sensitive to the value of the 
ratio .Awn /(wm + ()H). However, for proportions of temporary employment between 16% 
and 22%, the employment effects of introducing temporary contracts is between 2.7% 
increase and 4.7% increase. 
Figures 6 to 8 present the effects on employment, output and firm's value of several 
reductions in firing costs. The effects on employment are nonlinear with respect to the 
magnitude of the reduction in firing costs. According to our estimates, the hypothetical 
elimination of firing costs would increase (manufacturing) employment by 12%. However, 
a one-third reduction (from 51% to 34% of the annual wage) implies a 2.3% increase in 
employment. The effects on output and firm's value are more linear with respect to the 
reduction in firing costs: in particular, a one-third reduction in firing costs implies a 2.3% 
increase in output and a 3.6% increase in the firm's value. 
Concluding remarks 
Using panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms, we have estimated a dynamic labor de-
mand model and evaluated the effects of a reform that introduced temporary contracts in 
1984. We find important effects of the reform on employment and job turnover. However, 
compared with a hypothetical reduction in firing costs for all contracts, the effects of the 
reform on output and value of a firm are very modest. This is explained by the different 
proportion of low firm-specific experience workers under the two reforms. The introduc-
tion of temporary contracts leads to larger increases in employment and job turnover of 
low experience workers, and therefore to a lower improvement in productivity and firms' 
profits. We also find that firing costs have a very important negative effect on Span-
lOSince we ha\'e not jointly estimated >., OH and wn /wm , we do not have estimates for their covariances. 
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ish employment. The hypothetical elimination of these costs would increase employment 
(12%), output (11%), and firm's value (14%). 
We have concentrated our analysis on manufacturing employment. However, the pro-
portion of temporary contracts is much larger in the service industry. This might suggest 
smaller returns of firm-specific experience and larger employment effects of the reform 
in the service industry. However, this will depend on the values of the rest of structural 
parameters, which can be different in the two industries (e.g., persistence of idiosyncratic 
shocks, technological parameters, wage differential). Due to data limitations, our specifi-
cation of the relationship between productivity and firm-specific experience is inevitably 
simple. Availability of data sets matching information of individual workers and firms 
would allow a much richer specification of this learning process. Finally, but very impor-
tantly, our model does not take into account that a reduction in firing costs may have 
negative effects on the bargaining position and the wage of permanent workers. If so, 
we would be probably underestimating the effect on employment of a reduction in firing 
costs. The answer to this question requires to introduce wage bargaining in our labor 
demand model. We consider these as interesting issues for further research. 
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Appendix 1: Proofs of Lemmas 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
The decision of temporary employment is static. Since the one-period profit function 
is strictly concave in rn, it is simple to show that, given current permanent employment 
n, the optimal amount of temporary workers is: 
-( m A)-{ ~{L*(Wm,17,A)-n} if L*(Wm,17,A»n 
m n,w ,17, - 0 V L*(Wm,17,A)::5 n 
We can solve m(.) in the one-period profit function 1r(.) to obtain a function that does 
not depend explicitly on temporary employment. 
1r*(N + d, d, x) 	 = F(max{N d, L*}, 17, A) - wn(N + d) - wm* max{L* - N - d, O} 
- (JP J(d > O)d + (JFJ(d < O)d 
where x =(w, 17, AY. 
Based on this profit function we can define a dynamic decision model where the only 
decision variable is d. By construction, the optimal decision rule in this new problem is 
the same as the optimal decision rule for d in the original model. It is simple to verify 
that 1r*(.) is: (1) continuous and differentiable with respect to N at any point (included 
N + d = L*); (2) continuous in d at any point; (3) differentiable with respect to d at any 
point except d = 0; and (4) strictly concave with respect to (N, d). Therefore, we can 
apply Theorem 9.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1987) to prove that the optimal decision rule 
exists and it is a continuous function (not a correspondence), and that the value function 
is strictly concave in N. 
Our proof for the differentiability at any point of the value function is heuristic. Con-
sider a sequence of finite horizon problems with time horizon T = 1,2, .... For T = 1, it is 
straightforward to prove that the value function (Le., one-period profit evaluated at the 
optimal choice) is differentiable. Now, by induction, it is possible to prove that the value 
function of any finite horizon problem is differentiable. Finally, if the profit function is 
bounded, the value function of the infinite horizon problem is equal to the limit as T goes 
to infinite of the value function of the finite problem (see Puterman 1995). 
FLet nP and n be the optimal levels of permanent employment if the firm decides to 
increase and to reduce n, respectively, 
- argmax G(n,x) -(JPd. {n} 
_ argmax G(n, x) + (JFd. {n} 
Since G(.) is continuous, differentiable, and strictly concave, nP and nF are functions, 
and they are implicitly defined by equations: Gn(nP,x) = (JP, and Gn(nF,x) = _(JF. 
Furthermore, the concavity of G(.) implies that nF is always larger than nP • It is clear that 
nPif nP > N the optimal decision for permanent employment is d* = - N. Alternatively, 
Fif n < N the optimal decision is d* = nF - N. Notice that both cases are mutually 
Fexclusive (because n > nP ). Taking into account the strict concavity of G(.), we can 
represent these two cases in terms of inequalities for the marginal profit at n = N. 
nP(x) > N {::} Gn(N, x) > (JP 
nF(x) < N {::} Gn(N,x) < _(JF 
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That is, it is optimal to increase (reduce) permanent employment when the marginal 
intertemporal profit, at the initial level of permanent employment, is greater (lower) than 
Pzero. The other possible case is n ~ N ~ nF • Again, this case can be represented in 
terms of inequalities for the marginal intertemporal profit. 
nP ~ N ~ nF {::} _OF < Gn(N, x) ~ oP 
The marginal profit at n = N is positive from the left and negative from the right. 
Therefore, n = N is the maximum of the intertemporal profit function, and the optimal 
decision is d'" = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2. 
By Lemma 1, the value function V(N,x,c:) is continuous and differentiable at any 
point with respect to all its arguments. Furthermore, the transitional densities of the 
state variables are continuous and differentiable. Therefore, 
EVn(n,x) 8E(V[n,x',c:'] I n,x)/8n = E(8V[n,x',c:']j8n I n,x). 
Given the form of the optimal decision rule for permanent employment, the Bellman's 
equation can be written as follows: 
V(N,x,c:) - I(d*[s] >O){7r"'(nP,nP -N,x,c:)+I3E(V[nP,x',c:'] I nP,x)} 
+ I(d*[s] = 0) {7r*(N,O,x,c:) + I3E(V[N,x',c:'] I N,x)} 
Therefore, the partial derivative of the value function with respect to N is: 
8V[N,x,c:]j8N - I(d"'[s] > 0) oP 
+ I(d*[s] = 0) {MpO(N,x) - c: + 13 EVn(N,x)} 
+ I(d*[s] < 0) (-OF) 
And: 
EVn(n,x) - E(I{d*[s'] > O} I n,x) OP 
+ E (I {d*[s'] = O} {MP(n, x') - c:' + 13 EVn(n, x')} I n, x) 
+ E(I{d*[s'] > O} I n,x) (_OF) 
It is simple to verify that Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction (monotonic-
ity and discounting) hold. \ 
32  
I'  
11 
I1 	 Appendix 2: Data appendix 
The sample consists on an unbalanced panel of non-energy manufacturing firms with a 
\1 public share lower than 50 percent reported to the Bank of Spain's Central Balance Sheet 
Office from 1982 to 1993. To obtain the final sample of 2,356 firms we have eliminated 
those for which some of the following variables were negative or took implausible values: 
J book value of capital stock, sales, gross output, totallabor costs, permanent employment, 
and temporary employment. 
'I!,I 
ii 
Employment. 	 Number of employees is disaggregated in permanent and temporary 
",,:, 
.' 	
employees. To maintain measurement consistency, number of temporary employees is 
.1\	 calculated in annual terms by multiplying the number of temporary employees along the 
year times the average number of weeks worked by temporary employees and divided by 
52. 
Real wages. Nominal wages for permanent and temporary workers at the 2 digits 
industry level and for different firm sizes were obtained from the 1988 and 1992 Dis­
tribuci6n Salarial en Espana (Source: Spanish Institute of National Statistics, hereinafter 
INE). This measures were deflated using Retail Price Indexes at 2 digits industry level 
(Source: INE). 
Output. Gross output at retail prices is calculated as total sales, plus the change in 
finished product inventories and other income from the production process, minus taxes 
derived on the production (net of subsidies). Real output has been obtained using as 
deflator the Retail Price Index at 3 digits industry level. 
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Table A.1  
Distribution of firms by 2-digit industry and by size  
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 firms)  
Small Medl Med 2 Large Total· 
Iron, steel Abs. freq. 5 8 10 22 45 
and metal % by ind. 11.11 17.78 22.22 48.89 100.00 
(22) % by size 1.29 0.94 1.73 4.10 1.91 
Bldg. materials Abs. freq. 27 88 34 33 182 
glass, ceramics % by ind. 14.84 48.35' 18.68 18.13 100.00 
(24) 	 % by size 6.98 10.29 5.89 6.15 7.72 
Chemicals 	 Abs. freq. 39 99 76 92 306 
% by ind. 12.75 32.35 24.84 32.07 100.00 
(25) % by size 10.08 11.58 13.17 17.13 12.99 
N on-ferrous Abs. freq. 38 103 53 31 225 
metal % by ind. 16.89 45.78 23.56 13.78 100.00 
(31) % by size 9.82 12.05 9.19 5.77 9.55 
Basic Abs. freq. 29 52 47 33 161 
machinery % by ind. 18.01 32.30 29.19 20.50 100.00 
(32) % by size 7.49 6.08 8.15 6.15 6.83 
Office Abs. freq. 0 1 0 3 4 
machinery % by ind. 0.00 25.00 0.00 75.00 100.00 
(33) % by size 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.56 0.17 
Electric Abs. freq. 11 29 24 35 99 
materials % by ind. 11.11 29.29 24.24 35.35 100.00 
(34) 	 % by size 2.84 3.39 4.16 6.52 4.20 
Electronic 	 Abs. freq. 3 8 10 14 35 
% by ind. 8.57 22.86 28.57 40.00 100.00 
(35) 	 % by size 0.78 0.94 1.73 2.61 1.49 
Motor vehicles 	 Abs. freq. 8 21 25 36 13 
% by ind. 8.89 23.33 27.78 40.00 100.00 
(36) % by size 2.07 2.46 4.33 6.70 3.82 
Ship Abs. freq. 3 2 2 6 13 
building % by ind. 23.08 15.38 15.38 46.15 100.00 
(37) % by size 0.78 0.23 0.35 1.12 0.55 
Other Abs. freq. 2 5 5 6 18 
motor vehicles % by ind. 11.11 27.78 27.78 33.33 100.00 
(38) % by size 0.52 0.58 0.87 1.12 0.76 
Precision Abs. freq. 2 8 3 4 17 
instruments % by ind. 11.76 47.06 17.65 23.53 100.00 
(39) 	 % by size 0.52 0.94 0.52 0.74 0.72 
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Table A.l (cont.)  
Distribution of firms by 2-digit industry and by size  
Unbalanced panel 1982-1993 (2356 firms)  
Small Medl Med 2 Large Total 
Non-elaborated Abs. freq. 23 83 46 48 230 
food % by ind. 23.04 36.09 20.00 20.87 100.00 
(41) % by size 13.70 9.71 7.97 8.94 9.76 
Food, tobacco Abs. freq. 53 51 31 45 180 
and drinks % by ind. 29.44 28.33' 17.22 25.00 100.00 
(42) % by size 13.70 5.96 5.37 8.38 7.64 
Basic Abs. freq. 20 57 53 37 167 
Textile % by ind, 11.98 34.13 31.74 22.16 100.00 
(43) % by size 5.17 6.67 9.19 6.89 7.09 
Leather Abs. freq. 4 16 12 4 36 
% by ind. 11.11 44.44 33.33 11.11 100.00 
(44) % by size 1.03 1.87 2.08 0.74 1.53 
Garment Abs. freq. 11 48 34 22 115 
% by ind. 9.57 41.74 29.57 19.13 100.00 
(45) % by size 2.84 5.61 5.89 4.10 4.88 
Wood and Abs. freq. 21 45 26 8 100 
furniture % by ind. 21.00 45.00 26.00 8.00 100.00 
(46) % by size 5.43 5.26 4.51 1.49 4.24 
Cellulose and Abs. freq. 29 63 42 33 167 
paper edition % by ind. 17.37 37.72 25.15 19.76 100.00 
(47) % by size 7.49 7.37 7.28 6.15 7.09 
Plastic Abs. freq. 22 46 33 17 118 
materials % by ind. 18.64 38.98 27.97 14.41 100.00 
(48) % by size 5.68 5.38 5.72 3.17 5.01 
Other Abs. freq. 7 22 11 8 48 
non-basic % by ind. 14.58 45.83 22.92 16.67 100.00 
(49) % by size 1.81 2.57 1.91 1.49 2.04 
Total Abs. freq. 387 855 577 537 2356 
% by ind. 16.43 36.29 24.49 22.79 100.00 
% by size 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Small means firm's time average of total employment lower or equal than 25. Med 
1 means firm's time average of total employment greater than 25 and lower or equal than 
75. Med 2 means firm's time average of total employment greater than 75 and lower or 
equal than 200. Large means firm's time average of total employment greater than 200. 
! 
: ! 
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(l.c) Obtain the vectors viJ(i\ ~), vP(P, ~), vF(P, ~), vMP(P, ~), and ve(P, ~), and 
{ AP, AP AF AMP Ae} r h b t' . th Ithe va ues I Vitl Vu , vit , Vit , Vit .Lor eac 0 serva Ion III e samp e. 
Second stage: 
Define the pseudo log-likelihood function: 
I Ti 
[(02) = L L {lit(MFi~ + oHI;i° + iJevn[Nih Xit; O2, P, ~], M ~t + OH I;i 
i=l t=l 
where: 
Obtain the pseudo maximum likelihood estimator of O2, 
This estimate of O2 is asymptotically equivalent to the partial MLE (see Aguirregabiria 
and Mira, 1998). However, if the initial estimates of the conditional choice probabilities 
are imprecise, the finite samples bias and variance of this estimator can be substantially 
larger than the ones of the partial MLE. Therefore, we apply a third stage. 
Third stage: 
(3.a) Based on the previous estimate of O2 we obtain new estimates of the vectors of 
conditional choice probabilities. For instance, . 
pP = cl> ([MPO + OH I m+ Pe VI-' + (Pe + OP) vP+ (Pe - OF) vF + vf!P - Ue v:tl/ue) 
Notice that now these estimates exploit the structure of the modeL 
(3.b) Using the new conditional choice probabilities, apply (l.c) and the second stage. 
(3.c) Apply (3.a)-(3.b) until reaching convergence.  
Aguirregabiria and Mira (1998) show that this procedure provides the partial MLE  
of O2, Furthermore, they report very significant improvements in finite sample efficiency 
even if one applies the third stage only once (Le., without reaching convergence). 
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Appendix 3: Estimation of the dynamic structural model 
Let 1(0) the log-likelihood function of the model defined in equations (27) and (28). 
1 Ti 
1(0) = LL lit(MPi~ + OH I~O + {3 EVn[Nit , Xit; 0], MPit + oH I~ + {3 EVn[nit,Xit; 0]; 0), 
i=l t=l 
where lit(.) is the contribution of observation (i, t) to the log-likelihood function. First, 
we show that EVn (.) can be written in terms of known functions of the probabilities of 
firing and promotion, transition probabilities of observable state variables, and one-period 
marginal profits. 
Using Lemma 2 and taking into account that e and x are independently distributed: 
+ E(MpOf I n,x) - Ut;: E(e[n, x'] I n,x), 
+ {3 E(pO[n,x'] I n,x) E(EVN[n,x'] I n,x) 
where e(n, x) = E(I{d*[s] = O}e*/ut;: I n,x). It is possible to show that e(.) is a function 
of the choice probabilities pP(n, x) and pF(n, x). We denote this function by e(P[n, xl). 
In particular, given that e* is normally distributed: e(P[n, x]) = 4>(<p-1[pP(n, x)]) ­
q,(<p-l[pF(n, x)J) where 4> and <p-1 are the density function and the inverse of the cumu-
lative distribution function for the standard normal. 
This recursive expression shows that EVn(n, x) can be written as a function: 
EVn(n,x) = evn(n,x; P, Mpo, W,(2) 
where O2 = (J.Lt;: , Ut;:, OP, OF, OH, {3). To obtain a closed form expression for evn, we consider 
a discretization of the space of observable state variables, Le., (n, x) E {Zl, z2, ... ,ZM}. 
We can write the contraction mapping for the marginal value function using the following 
vector notation: 
where evn, pP, pF, pO, MpO and e(P) are Mxl vectors; 'Ill is the MxM matrix of 
transition probabilities of the state variables; and * is the Hadamard or element-by-
element product. Solving for eVn we obtain: 
eVn 	 - (lM - {3 'Ill pOt1[-J.Lt;: + (J.Lt;: + OP) 'Ill pP + (J.Lt;: - OP) 'Ill pP + 'Ill M po - Ut;:W e(P)] 
= J.Lt;: vll(P, 'Ill) + (J.Lt;: + OP) vP(P, 'Ill) + (J.Lt;: - OF) vP(P, 'Ill) + vMP(P, 'Ill) - Ut;: ve(P, w) 
where vll , vP, vP, vMP , and ve Mxl vectors with the obvious definitions. 
The estimation algorithm proceeds as follows: 
First 	stage: 
(1.a) Estimate the stochastic processes of "1 and w, and construct the estimated matrix 
of transition probabilities ,J,. 
(1.b) Obtain nonparametric estimates of the vectors of conditional choice probabilities, 
P. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of the sign of net changes in permanent employment 
and the indicator of severance payments 
Source: eBBE sample of 2356 manufacturing firms, 1986-1990 
Change in permanent 
employment 
Negative Zero Positive Total 
Zero 2658 1482 2861 7001 
Severance (28.5%) (15.9%) (30.7%) (75.1%) 
payments Positive 1156 272 896 2324 
(12.4%) (2.9%) (9.6%) (24.9%) 
Total 3814 1754 4857 9325 
(40.9%) (18.8%) (40.3%) (100.0%) 
Table 2  
Severance payment per worker and workers'voluntary quits (sample medians)  
Source: eBBE sample of 2356 manufacturing firms, 1986-1990  
Year 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Severance payment per worker relative 
to gross wage of permanent workers 56.4% 72.0% 78.0% 64.0% 58.4% 
Tenure of a dismissed worker (in years) 4.5 5.8 6.2 5.1 4.7 
Severance payment per worker 
relative to firm's annual sales 0.68% 0.73% 0.74% 0.73% 0.70% 
Quit rate 2.4% 1.9% 2.3% 2.5% 3.3% 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics (Weighted averages) 
Source: CBBE sample of 2356 manufacturing firms, 1982-1993 
Year 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Rates of growth (%) 
Real output 4.84 1.19 2.14 4.57 9.98 9.25 7.22 -0.60 0.66 1.16 -2.59 
Employment -0.10 -1.54 -1.44 -1.18 -0.70 1.36 0.03 -2.14 -2.20 -2.60 -5.19 
Permanent -0.09 -1.94 -1.60 -2.00 -1.60 -0.~4 -1.73 -1.71 -1.86 -2.34 -4.20 
Temporary -0.49 17.52 4.11 26.41 24.46 35.55 26.39 -7.09 -5.01 -4.88 -13.46 
Job creation and job destruction rates (%) 
Total Employment 
Job creation 2.64 
Job destruction 2.75 
Permanent Employment 
\ Job creation 2.45 
Job destruction 2.55 
Temporary Employment 
1.90 2.46 2.68 2.62 3.84 3.77 2.67 3.29 3.36 2.31 
3.44 3.92 3.86 3.32 2.49 3.74 4.84 5.52 5.01 7.63 
1.53 2.16 2.09 1.78 2.53 2.74 2.34 2.87 3.05 2.07 
3.49 3.77 4.11 3.39 2.67 4.49 4.07 4.74 5.41 6.37 
Job creation 28.31 35.90 27.72 38.11 37.28 39.56 33.97 20.64 17.51 19.53 12.40 
Job destruction 28.80 19.79 23.70 14.78 15.49 10.83 10.66 28.00 22.65 24.53 26.83 
Labour shares (in percentage ot total employment) 
Permanent 98.04 97.92 97.29 97.11 96.49 95.58 93.95 92.03 92.37 89.31 89.23 90.28 
Temporary 1.96 2.08 2.71 2.89 3.51 4.42 6.05 7.97 7.63 10.69 10.77 9.72 
; . 
, I 
I Table 4 
Job Destruction of Permanent Workers 
Firings and Voluntary Quits: 1986-1990 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Job destruction rate  
Firing rate  
Quit rate  
% Firing / Total JD  
4.11 3.39 2.67 4.49 4.07 
1.64 1.97 1.52 2.49 2.39 
2.47 1.42 1.15 2.00 1.67 
39.9 58.1 56.9 55.5 58.7 
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Table 5 
Wage differential between permanent and temporary contracts 
Decomposition of wage differential from wage equation(a) 
Data: Spanish Active Population Survey: (EPA) 1987(b) 
Mean for Mean for Contribution 
Permanents Temporaries to wage differential 
Education 0.034 
Age (in years) 41.24 29.88 0.078 
Sex (female) 0.287 0.276 0:002 
Firm-spec. expo 12.98 0.72 0.111 
Married 0.73 0.39 0.034 
Total human capital 0.259 
Industry 0.077 
Residual 0.091 
Total 0.427 
(a) Specification of wage equation: 10 educational dummies,Age, Age2,  
6 age dummies, 6 firm-specific experience dummies, sex, marital status,  
58 industry dummies, and permanent contract dummy.  
(b) Spanish Active Population Survey (EPA), 1987. Subsample of  
"Encuesta piloto" (with information on wages). Number of observations: 1087.  
CB BE data. Firms' panel: 1986-1993 
Dep. variable: In(Firm's average wage)(c) 
Within-firms Within-firms First-diff First-diff 
OL8 OL8 IV(d) IV(d) 
T - 1 0.227 0.291 0.222 0.216 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.096) (0.091) 
In(Real output) 0.102 0.090 
(0.005) (0.007) 
Number Obs. 13,382 13,382 10,941 10,941 
(c) Estimations include time dummies. 
(d) Instruments: Prop. of temporaries at t - 2 and t - 3, time dummies and real output. 
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Table 6  
Estimation of Technological parameters  
Sample: CBBE 1986-1993  
Marginal conditions of temporary employment 
Parameters NLLS NLLS Within Within 
NLLS NLLS 
0.768 0.776 0.800 0.795 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) 
1.034 1.000 0.901 1.000 
(0.012) (-) (0.021) (-) 
# Obs 8739 8739 8739 8739 
White's standard errors robust to conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Production function. GMM in First Differences 
Parameters Free A Fixed A 
No eRS eRS 
aK 0.148 0.302 
(0.106) (-) 
aL 0.612 0.698 
(0.122) (0.102) 
A 0.825 0.795 
(0.191) (-) 
p 0.673 0.691 
(0.071) (0.072) 
I i Ua 0.194 0.196 
: I 
I' (0.031) (0.031) 
# Obs. 10,941 10,941 
Tests of 1st and 2nd order residual autocorrelation 
ml (p - value) -2.39 (0.00) -2.41 (0.00) 
m2 (p - value) 0.57 (0.58) 0.54 (0.59) 
Hansen-Sargan test: 
X2 (p - value) 43.0 (0.39) 45.9 (0.28) 
Wald test of Ho: No endogenous exit 
X2 (p - value) 47.2 (0.00) 47.8 (0.00) 
All the estimations include time and industry dummies and a 
second order polynomial in estimated probabilities of exit. 
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Table 7  
Dynamic Decision Model  
Partial Maximum Likelihood Estimation  
Sample period: 1986-1990 
Homogeneous costs Heterogeneous costs 
Without With Without With 
quits quits quits quits 
F ()f"4>=- 0.297 0.470 0.330 0.511 wn 
(0.081) (0.056) (0.077) (0.048) 
4>P = (JP 0.139 0.108 0.142 0.098 
wn 
(0.078) (0.055) (0.071) (0.046) 
4>H = (JH 0.143 0.147 0.154 0.159 
wm 
(0.085) (0.061) (0.081) (0.052) 
- J1.c: 
J1.c: = - -0.022 0.088 -0.035 0.092 
wn 
(0.098) (0.084) (0.092) (0.055) 
_ O'c: 
O'c: = - 0.401 0.277 0.352 0.183 
wn 
(0.105) (0.076) (0.100) (0.037) 
Number obs. 9875 9875 9875 9875 
Log likelihood -8264.6 -6975.2 -8011.5 -6873.3 
Likelihood ratio index 0.200 0.280 0.224 0.291 
With heterogeneous costs we specify labor adjustment costs in firm i 
as proportional to the average wage in firm i. 
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Table 8  
Experiments  
Introduction of temporary contracts and reduction in firing costs  
Effects on employment, job turnover, output and value of a firm  
Introduction of Reduction in firing costs 
temporary from 51% to 25% 
contracts of the gross wage 
I ~%in total employment 3.7 3.5 
I: 
1 Job turnover rates (%): 
11 
Total employment 11.2 9.8; 1 
Permanent employment 4.6 9.8I:
I 
11 
Change in job turnover rates: 
Total employment 5.8 4.4 
Permanent employment -0.8 4.4 
%of temporaries 19.5 0.0 
~% in output 0.9 3.9 
~% in value of a firm 1.6 5.6 
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Figure , (rho=O.40)  
Chonge in employment ofter reduction in fir. cost  
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Figure 2 (rho=O.80)  
Chonge in employment ofter reduction in fir. cost  
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Figure 3  
Change in real output after reduction in fir. cost  
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Figure 4  
Change (7.) ·n tctol emplcyment for different relative wages  
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Figure 5  
Proportion temporory employment for different relotive woges  
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Figure 6 
7. C!'1Cr1ge in employment ofter reduction in firing costs 
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7. Change in 
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Figure 7 
output after reduction in firing costs 
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Figure 8 
7. Cr,O"ge in value of 0 firm after reduction in firing cost 
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